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ESSAYS 
U.C.C. ARTICLE 2 WARRANTIES  
AND INTERNET-BASED TRANSACTIONS:  
DO THE ARTICLE 2 WARRANTIES SUFFICIENTLY 
PROTECT INTERNET-BASED TRANSACTIONS WITH 
UNPROFESSIONAL INTERNET MERCHANTS? 
Daniel K. Wiig1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1995, buyers and sellers have converged on eBay, the largest 
person-to-person online system, to bid on and auction off a variety of 
items.2  eBay brings people together in a manner in which sellers are 
permitted to list items for sale, buyers can bid on items of interest, and 
all users can browse through the listed items in with ease.  The items are 
arranged by category; eBay boasts roughly 4,320 different categories of 
items to choose from.3  These items include automobiles, collectibles, 
antiques, toys, books, computer paraphernalia,4 and even New Zealand!5  
On this and other similar person-to-person trading sites, buyers are 
compelled to shop because of the large amount of items available, and 
sellers are compelled to conduct business because of the large pool of 
buyers.  Each day, nearly 4 million auctions take place and 450,000 
 1. Daniel K. Wiig is law clerk for the Honorable Richard B. Lowe III, Justice, 
Commercial Division, New York Supreme Court.  He earned a J.D. from Brooklyn Law 
School in 2006; an M.B.A. from Fordham University in 2002; and a B.S. from St. 
John’s University in 1995.  He would like to thank Ted Janger, Professor of Law at 
Brooklyn Law School, for his advice and guidance. 
 2. eBay is only one of a number of internet-based venues that permit 
unprofessional sellers to enter goods into the flow of commerce. 
 3. See generally eBay Home Page, available at http://www.ebay.com (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2007) (offering statistics about eBay). 
 4. Id. 
 5. eBay Pulls Sale of New Zealand, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2006 at A6. 
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items are added on eBay.6
Welcome to the Internet Age! It started with the “boom” in the mid-
1990s and, despite a few busts here and there, continues to progress.  It 
is the age of the desktop shopper.  It is the age in which an individual 
can take care of shopping needs from the comfort of home or office.  It 
is the age in which those hard-to-find items are a few mouse clicks 
away.  But it isn’t just the age that added convenience to the buyer; it is 
also the age that saw the birth of a new kind of seller: the 
“unprofessional Internet merchant.”7  It is the age that allowed 
individuals to conveniently sell unwanted goods by simply posting an 
advertisement on a website.  Unlike the age of old, where such a person 
would have to host a garage sale or find a flea market in order to transact 
with potential buyers, the Internet age conveniently provides a new 
venue. 
This has revolutionized the “distance sale,” a faceless transaction 
between two people set apart.  Historically, established merchants 
conducted a faceless-distance sale via a catalogue, e.g., Sears Robach & 
Company.  Or, two established merchants conducted the distance sale 
between themselves, e.g., the baker ordering chocolate from the 
chocolate factory. In both scenarios, buyer and seller knew whom they 
were transacting with.8  But now, a distance sale is a faceless transaction 
between two people who know nothing about each other except their 
respective screen-names. 
While these new faceless-distance transactions may be the logical 
outgrowth of the Internet age, the rules found in Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code9 (“Article 2”), which were originally devised for 
face-to-face transactions, may be inappropriate.10  Assume that Seller, a 
lawyer by profession, sells what she describes as a “rare” coin on eBay.  
This coin was in her possession for some time before she decided to sell 
the coin.11  Assume that Buyer places the highest bid for the coin on 
 6. See eBay Homepage, supra note 3. 
 7. The phrase “unprofessional internet merchant” was developed by this author 
and will be used throughout this essay. 
 8. An established merchant is known to both its customers and business partners. 
 9. U.C.C. Art. 2 (2003). 
 10. Article 2 is also applicable to the historical faceless-distance transaction.  This 
will be discussed more in depth, infra. 
 11. The fact that the seller did not simply sell the coin that was still in the original 
package denies the seller the “sealed-box” defense. The sealed-box defense is 
applicable when a merchant sells a good still in its original packaging. 
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eBay.  Buyer is notified by eBay that Buyer “won,” and then Buyer 
conducts the transaction with Seller.12  Shortly thereafter, Buyer takes 
possession of the coin.  The coin, however, is not “rare” as Buyer 
understood the term to mean.  Seller was not guilty of any fraud with 
respect to the sale—she used the term “rare” as she honestly believed the 
term should be used.13  Buyer then claims that the coin is not accepted 
as a “rare” coin in the ordinary course of the coin business.14  Does 
Buyer have any recourse against Seller?  What should the “reasonable” 
buyer surfing eBay expect from such a potential transaction?15
In a face-to-face transaction, the buyer likely knows with whom the 
buyer is transacting: is the seller a person whose business it is to sell 
goods of this kind?  If so, the buyer can reasonably be assured that the 
seller has expertise in, and knowledge of, the good sold.  Therefore, a 
reasonable buyer has certain justifiable expectations with regard to the 
transaction that go beyond any representations the seller makes with 
respect to the good sold.16  The Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
(the “implied warranty”) provides the protective covering for such a 
 12. See eBay Homepage, supra note 2.  Sellers list a good on eBay with a 
minimum price and a deadline for the auction to end.  Once the deadline closes, eBay 
notifies the winning buyer.  Based upon the seller’s payment instructions, the actual 
purchase then follows. 
 13. Affirming the quality of the good amounts to an express warranty.  
U.C.C. § 2-313 (2003).  The express warranty, unlike the implied warranty, can be 
made by any seller, regardless of the “type” of seller.  This will be discussed in further 
detail, infra. 
 14. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314, deals with what is 
considered acceptable in the ordinary course of business. This will be discussed in 
further detail, infra. 
 15. Disputes over items not received or received but significantly not as described 
can usually be resolved by direct communication between buyers and sellers.  eBay 
provides an online process to help facilitate communication.  See eBay Help Topic 
“Item Not Received or Significantly Not as Described Process,” available at 
http://pages.ebay.in/help/tp/inr-snad-process.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).  
Although dispute resolution options are provided and encouraged by eBay, the user 
agreement does not explicitly limit a user’s traditional common law rights to seek 
redress for tortious activity.  See Sayeedi v. Walser, No. 10610/06, 2007 WL 623521, at 
*1 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Feb. 27, 2007). 
 16. The Implied Warranty of Merchantability is almost a second-line defense for 
the buyer.  If the express warranty cannot protect the buyer and the transaction, the 
implied warranty could. But this hinges on whether the seller is a goods merchant, as 
defined in U.C.C. § 2-104.  See U.C.C. § 2-314(1). 
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transaction. 17
Is the seller merely attempting to dispense with unwanted 
Christmas gifts?  If so, the buyer has little assurance, other than what is 
expressly stated regarding the good.  Therefore, a reasonable buyer 
would have limited justifiable expectations with regard to the transaction 
beyond what was expressly promised. 
In the former, the seller would be classified as a “merchant”18 and 
therefore gives the implied warranty.19  In the latter, the seller would not 
be classified as a merchant; the implied warranty is therefore 
inapplicable.  But what about an Internet-based transaction, where the 
buyer has no knowledge of the seller and the seller’s knowledge level of 
the good is higher-than-average, yet does not rise to the level of the 
professional merchant? 
This essay examines how changes in commerce brought about by 
the Internet have led to a need for Article 2 to evolve and adapt.  
Specifically, Article 2 needs to take into account the new merchant 
class, the “unprofessional Internet merchant,” and a new warranty that 
would protect transactions between this new type of merchant and a 
potential buyer.  Warranties provide a protective covering for 
transactions.  But knowledge and expertise, the foundational elements 
for Article 2’s warranties, are not necessarily present in all Internet-
based transactions.  Therefore, the current Article 2 warranties may not 
always offer sufficient protection.  Part II will briefly examine the 
different definitions of “merchant” found in Article 2 Section 2-104.  
Part III will examine the history, purposes, and theories behind the 
concept of warranties.  Part IV will examine the implied and express 
warranties, and some theories as to why the implied warranty applies 
only to a goods merchant.  Part V will re-examine the hypothetical 
transaction described at the start of this essay under four scenarios: (1) 
The face-to-face transaction with a professional merchant; (2) the face-
to-face transaction with an unprofessional merchant; (3) the faceless-
distance transaction with a professional merchant; and (4) the faceless-
distance transaction with an unprofessional merchant.  Part VI will 
 17. The same analysis would be applicable to the historical faceless-distance sale 
between established merchants or between an established merchant selling goods via a 
catalogue. 
 18. The term “merchant” is defined to include both someone who deals in the 
particular goods involved in the transaction and someone who holds him or herself out 
as having expertise in a specific good.  U.C C. § 2-104(1) (2003). 
 19. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1). 
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further analyze the faceless-distance transaction with an unprofessional 
Internet merchant and suggest new warranties that are more appropriate 
for this new type of transaction.  Part VII concludes the essay with 
suggested additions to Article 2. 
II. ARTICLE 2 MERCHANT DEFINITIONS 
An analysis of merchant qualification in Article 2 begins with 
Section 2-104. The section defines the term “merchant” as a person 
“who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by occupation is held out 
as possessing knowledge or a skill set that is particular to the practice or 
the goods involved in the transaction.”20  An individual is also deemed a 
merchant if this knowledge or skill set is attributed to the employment of 
an agent, broker, or other intermediary “who by his occupation holds 
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.”21
While it might appear from the outset that anyone who qualifies as 
a merchant under Section 2-104 must comply with all of Article 2’s 
default rules, the Code’s comments provide clarification.22  Merchant 
status depends on the particular Section involved, which in turn depends 
on the specific legal issue involved.23  The broad-stroke concept of the 
merchant seems to lie in the notion of professionalism: a person is a 
merchant because of some professional affiliation or activity.  With 
professionalism, of course, comes knowledge.  This notion of 
professionalism can manifest itself in two forms: professional status 
with respect to the trade of particular goods, or professional status with 
respect to general business practices. 
A. Merchant with Respect to Goods 
While Article 2 defines the term “merchant,” it does not clearly 
define “merchants with respect to goods of a particular kind.”  However, 
comments to the Code indicate that this is a much smaller group than 
simply anyone engaged in a business.24  This refers only to individuals 
who deal in particular goods: a person who sells golf balls, a 
 
 20. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2003). 
 21. Id. 
 22. § 2-104 Official Comment 2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. § 2-104 Official Comment. 
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manufacturer of coffee machines, and a company that manufactures 
widgets would all be considered merchants with respect to the specific 
good sold.  An individual who deals strictly in a certain type of good, 
and not one who simply engages in general business, is classified as a 
goods merchant. 
There are others who might appear to qualify as goods merchants, 
but in actuality do not.  The professional sailor who sells her boat, the 
professional golfer who sells his golf clubs, and the auto mechanic who 
sells his car, all by their profession may hold themselves out to be an 
expert in the particular field.  But their respective one-off, isolated sales 
cannot fit the notion of a seller with respect to goods of the kind.  For 
example, in Cohen v. Hathaway,25 commercial fishermen sold their 
boat, but the boat proved to be defective.  The fisherman committed no 
fraud, nor did he provide any express warranties.26  Since the court 
found that they were not in the business of selling boats, the court held 
that they were not merchants with respect to goods of the kind.27  
Likewise, the court held that an air-conditioning repair company was not 
a goods merchant when it sold a defective air-conditioning pump.28  The 
air-conditioning repair company was not in the business of selling 
pumps, nor did it sell enough pumps over a period of time to qualify as a 
de facto air-conditioning pump merchant. 29
In summary, in order to qualify as a goods merchant, the individual 
must display a pattern of selling a particular good over some period of 
time. And along with that pattern of selling comes an expertise or 
knowledge of that particular good. 
B. The Business-Practices Merchant 
Section 2-104’s comments include the merchant class of individuals 
who possess special knowledge related to general business practices.30  
This refers to almost every single person in business.  This class 
includes the grocery store owner, the used car salesman, and the major 
 
 25. 595 F. Supp. 579 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1984). 
 26. Id.at 583. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Storey v. Day Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 319 So. 2d 279, 281 (Ala. Ct. 
App. 1975). 
 29. Id. 
 30. § 2-104 Official Comment. 
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department store.31  The grocery store owner is a business merchant 
when bread is sold, the used car salesman is a business merchant when a 
car is sold, and the department store entity is a business merchant when 
a sofa-bed is sold.32  This distinction is limited to those situations in 
which the business merchant is selling in a business capacity, and not in 
a personal capacity. 33  When the grocery store owner sells his fishing 
rods, he is not functioning as a business merchant; he is not selling in the 
“official” capacity as a businessperson. 34
In summary, in order to qualify as a business merchant, the 
transaction in question must be within the business sphere.  Put simply: 
any person engaged in business is a business merchant under Article 2.  
The seller, however, must conduct the transaction in the role of 
businessperson within the business environment. 
III. HISTORY OF THE WARRANTY AND  
THE IDEA OF “MERCHANTABILITY” 
Underlying any express or implied warranty is the promise that the 
good sold will be as promised, or meet its ordinarily-expected baseline 
standard.35  The warranty is the “cushion”—the protection that the buyer 
is assured of when the transaction is made.  The cushion, it can be said, 
is premised on the buyer’s knowledge that the seller has a certain level 
of expertise. 
The first type of warranty given was the express warranty: goods 
delivered would be as promised.36  An action for breach of warranty 
arose out of the English Commodities Markets, and protected buyers 
who purchased goods that did not meet the sellers’ representations.37  
 31. Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 
341, 408 (1937). 
 32. Id.  It is worth noting that a merchant may satisfy the goods of the kind and 
business merchant qualifications simultaneously. 
 33. See Note 28, supra, at 320. Id. 
 34. Similarly, none of these aforementioned transactions could fall under the 
goods-merchant distinction, because none of these sellers has a particular skill or 
chronic sales experience with respect to the particular good. 
 35. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in 
Software Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 393, 394 (1997). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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The breach was first viewed as a tort under the doctrine of 
misrepresentation.38  This seems to be rather obvious: goods purchased 
should be as promised.  The car advertised as a 1966 Ford Mustang 
should be a 1966 Ford Mustang, and the jellybean jar advertised as 
bearing the signature of Ronald Reagan should be a jellybean jar bearing 
the signature of Ronald Reagan.  Allowing the aggrieved buyer a 
remedy is equitable and just. 
The tide turned in the 18th century, as businesspeople become more 
sophisticated (or, to be more cynical, more clever), and did not always 
make express warranties.  Buyers frequently found themselves 
purchasing goods that didn’t meet their expectation.  A good that should 
have functioned in one way didn’t, and buyers found themselves without 
recourse.39  As a result, another theory surfaced: the reasonable-buyer 
standard.40  The expectations of a reasonable buyer in the transaction 
were taken into account, and this reasonableness turned again on 
knowledge: it is reasonable for a buyer to expect something, beyond the 
express representations, when the seller possesses a heightened-level of 
knowledge in the good sold. 
Warranties, and the remedies for their breach, began to fall into the 
contract-law area.41  In order to provide a remedy for the aggrieved 
buyer who was not given an express warranty, the courts began to find 
an implied warranty in sales contracts.42  Since the courts couldn’t 
impose an express statement on what the particular good could or 
couldn’t do, the courts began to hold that within a sales contract was an 
implicit promise that the good met certain minimum-quality standards. 
43
An early case imposing the implied warranty was Gardiner v. 
Gray.44  In that case, the buyer purchased silk.  The silk turned out to be 
of very poor quality and not acceptable within the silk trade.  The buyer 
 38. William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. 
L. REV. 117, 118-19 (1943). 
 39. See generally Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Merchant in Section 2-314: Who 
Needs Him?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 747 (1983). 
 40. The term “reasonable-buyer standard” was developed by this author and will be 
used throughout the remainder of this essay. 
 41. Franklin E. Crawford, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose: Tobacco Litigation and the 
Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1168 (2002). 
 42. Ora Fred Harris, Jr. & Alphonse M. Squillante, 1 WARRANTY LAW IN TORT 
AND CONTRACT ACTIONS 179 (1989). 
 43. Id. at 180. 
 44. (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B.). 
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wanted to rescind the contract, but the seller argued that since no express 
warranty was made, the contract should remain intact.45  The Gardiner 
court disagreed, and allowed the buyer to rescind the contract.  The court 
held that the “intention of both parties must be taken to be, that the 
goods shall be saleable in the market under the denomination mentioned 
in the contract between them.”46  The court held that inherent in a 
contract naming a good was an implicit promise that the seller would 
deliver something that would normally be expected of the good.47  The 
court also inferred that the seller, who was a repeat seller of silk, had a 
heightened-level of silk-trade knowledge.  The buyer relied on the 
seller’s knowledge when the buyer entered the contract.48
The courts began to adopt the term “merchantable” to describe the 
implied warranty that they began to impose.49  The term was devised to 
describe the comparison of the good’s worthiness to others like it in the 
market.  Courts began to look to the good’s trade to see what was 
customarily expected of it.50  Subsequent cases adopted this standard: if 
no express warranty was included, a sales contract contained an implicit 
promise of merchantability.51  Not only must the good be of a quality 
that could be sold on the market, but the good must also be fit for its 
ordinary use.  These principles were first codified in the Uniform Sales 
Act52 and were carried over into Article 2.53
In summary, contract law evolved to include in a sales contract the 
implicit promise that the good sold would perform as ordinarily 
expected.  The coffeemaker would brew coffee without a problem, the 
car would run smoothly, and the lawnmower would work properly.  
There is logic to this: consumers should expect the good to perform 
normally and sellers should conduct business with due care.  A buyer 
should have confidence that a seller, in certain circumstances, possesses 
 45. Implicit in every contract for the sale of goods is that the transaction is 
conducted in “good faith.”  Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. at 47; See also U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).  
In the cases cited and in the hypothetical analyzed, good faith is assumed. 
 46. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. at 47. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Prosser, supra note 38, at 121. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. UNIF. SALES ACT § 15(2) (1906). 
 53. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1). 
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superior knowledge of the good sold, and that the superior knowledge is 
implicitly part of the bargain.  It is this concept of knowledge on which 
the implied warranty turns.  The drafters of Article 2 codified the 
implied warranty in Section 2-314.  Article 2, however, limits the class 
of sellers who give this implied warranty to the goods merchant.  
Section 2-314’s provisions and an analysis as to why the goods 
merchant is the only class of merchants to give this implied warranty is 
discussed below.54
IV. U.C.C. § 2-314 AND THE GOODS MERCHANT 
Section 2-314 is the Article 2 section for the implied warranty.  The 
implied warranty does not arise from any promise made by the seller, 
but rather arises by operation of law.55  The implicit promise is that the 
goods sold are merchantable.  Article 2 does not provide an exact 
definition of merchantable, but Section 2-314 instead provides a list of 
minimum qualities that must be met in order for goods to pass the 
merchantability test.56  The characteristics given for merchantable goods 
can be summarized in three broad categories: (1) the good must be of 
average quality compared to other goods in the industry, (2) it must be 
fit for the ordinary purpose for which it will be used, and (3) it must be 
properly packaged and labeled.57  In contrast to the express warranty,58 
which can be breached even if the good is not perfect but was advertised 
in such a way that made it closer to perfect, the implied warranty cannot 
be breached unless the good is defective in some way, i.e., not 
merchantable. 
Courts have found such defects in a variety of circumstances.  The 
seller breached the implied warranty when a mobile home proved 
defective with a leaky roof and inadequate plumbing.59  A mechanical 
device’s poor design was a breach of the implied warranty.60  Sellers 
 54. See Part IV., infra. 
 55. William H. Lawrence & William H. Henning, UNDERSTANDING SALES AND 
LEASES OF GOODS 130, (Matthew Bender ed., 1999). 
 56. U.C.C § 2-314(2) (2003). 
 57. See Lawrence & Henning, supra note 55, at 130-35. 
 58. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1).  An express warranty is created by “an affirmation of 
fact made by the seller to the buyer . . . .” 
 59. Frederick v. Dryer, 257 N.W. 2d 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).  Real property is not 
governed by U.C.C. Article 2. The mobile home was deemed personal, not real 
property. 
 60. Valley Iron and Steel v. Thomas, 562 P.2d 1221 (1977). 
2007 U.C.C. ARTICLE 2 WARRANTIES AND 727 
 INTERNET-BASED TRANSACTIONS 
 
were also liable for breach of the implied warranty when they failed to 
provide proper instructions on how to remove snow from a clogged 
snow blower.61 Goods that cannot perform the task for which they were 
purchased do not meet the merchantability test.  The seller breached the 
implied warranty when he sold a medical scanner that could only scan 
the head and not the entire body.62
Ever-present is the idea that the good must live up to the seller’s 
implicit promise and the reasonable buyer’s expectations.  However, the 
Article 2 drafters somehow believed that only a goods merchant 
implicitly promises that the minimum merchantability standards are met.  
This, on the surface, seems to contradict the underlying purposes of a 
warranty.  The buyer, whom the warranty is meant to protect, is 
protected only in certain, limited transactions. 
The drafter’s reasoning may be that a goods merchant has the 
special skill set and expertise that the business merchant would not.  
When a merchant deals only with one specific type of good, the 
merchant will develop a greater expertise in that good.  Like any person 
who hones a craft, over time a specialist is born.  It is the goods 
merchant who deals to such a high extent in a particular trade that the 
reasonable buyer’s heightened expectations are justified.  It is the goods 
merchant who by trade or by knowledge knows specifically how the 
good is used in the trade, what it should or shouldn’t do, and the normal 
differences between a like-used good and a like-new good.  The goods 
merchant makes a livelihood from this trade.  This drafters’ logic may 
be that to whom more is attributed, more is expected. 
V. ONE TRANSACTION, FOUR POSSIBLE RESULTS 
Article 2 was drafted in a time that pre-dated the Internet and the 
electronic-communication age.63  It was drafted in an age that 
contemplated face-to-face transactions, when buyer and seller met to 
conduct business.  It was drafted in an age that conceived only two types 
of merchants: the business merchant and the goods merchant.  It was 
 61. Hayes v. Am. Co., 462 N.E. 2d 273 (1977). 
 62. Computerized Radiological Serv. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
 63. For a concise history of the U.C.C., see Uniform Commercial Code—History, 
available at http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/management/Tr-Z/Uniform-
Commercial-Code.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007). 
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drafted in an age where the buyer likely knew exactly with whom the 
buyer was dealing with by virtue of a face-to-face transaction.  The 
buyer at the flea market likely knew he was dealing with a person trying 
to empty out his attic and make some extra money.  The buyer at the 
grocery store knew she was dealing with a person who was a 
“professional” in the grocery business and with respect to the goods sold 
in the grocery store. 
When Article 2 was drafted, the concept of a faceless-distance sale 
existed.  That earlier, faceless-distance sale was logically related to the 
face-to-face transaction: the faceless-distance sale involved, and could 
only involve, professional merchants.64  The buyer knew that the person 
on the other end of the faceless-distance transaction was a professional 
merchant.  The buyer, in turn, had the protection of Article 2 
assurances—if the express warranty did not, or could not, protect the 
transaction, the implied warranty provided the necessary protection. 
But the Internet has added a new dimension to the faceless-distance 
transaction, with the arrival of the unprofessional Internet merchant.  If a 
merchant is not a goods merchant, the implied warranty is inapplicable.  
This leaves only the express warranty as the protective covering for the 
transaction.  Express warranties, however, are not necessarily sufficient 
enough to protect a transaction. 
Let’s return to the hypothetical at the start of this article.  The buyer 
in a face-to-face transaction with a professional goods merchant has 
assurances: the buyer knows that this is a professional merchant, and 
that the merchant has a heightened-knowledge level in the coin.  
Furthermore, the buyer has the opportunity to examine the coin.  If there 
is an indication that the coin is not “rare”, the reasonable buyer may 
decline the transaction.  If the buyer buys the coin, the express and 
implied warranties protect the buyer.  If, however, the express warranty 
is inapplicable, i.e., buyer and seller attributed in good faith different 
meanings to the term “rare”, the implied warranty will still protect the 
transaction.  The buyer in this transaction gets the “fullness” of Article 
2’s inherent protections. 
The faceless-distance transaction with a professional goods 
merchant is not all that different.  In this situation, the buyer purchases 
the coin via the professional coin merchant’s mail-order catalogue or 
website.  The buyer knows the merchant, and with that knowledge 
 64. In the era that pre-dated the internet, only established merchants could 
financially afford to sell goods via a catalog or take any form of a “distance” order. 
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comes assurances.  Here, however, the buyer has no opportunity to 
examine the coin personally.  Rather, the buyer has to rely solely on the 
seller’s representations.  But again, if there is a good-faith dispute as to 
the meaning of the term “rare” as applied to the coin, the buyer has the 
added protection of the implied warranty.  The buyer again has the 
fullness of Article 2’s protections. 
The face-to-face transaction with an unprofessional merchant 
occurs at the garage sale, flea market, or in response to a classified 
advertisement.  The buyer in this situation has the opportunity to 
examine the coin to determine its “rareness,” and if the reasonable buyer 
determines after examination that the coin is not rare, the transaction can 
be voided.  But if the buyer purchases the coin, and if the coin is not as 
represented, the only Article 2-based protection is the express warranty.  
An honest, good-faith disagreement may exist as to the meaning of 
“rare.”  It is possible that in this one-off transaction, an aggrieved buyer 
may have no remedy.  It is here that caveat emptor may still apply. 65
The faceless-distance transaction with an unprofessional Internet 
merchant occurs when the buyer “surfs” the World Wide Web, and 
shops on a person-to-person site.  The buyer can only rely on the seller’s 
representations—there is no opportunity to examine the coin.  The result 
here is essentially the same as the previous hypothetical: the seller is 
dealing with an unprofessional merchant and only the express warranty 
is available.  If there is a good-faith conflict as to the meaning of “rare”, 
the buyer is once again subject to the doctrine of caveat emptor.  This 
begs the question: why the concern in this latter-day, Internet-age 
transaction when the possibility of this outcome has existed since the 
advent of the garage sale or the flea market? 
The answer lies in the frequency of the activity, and the desire to 
make the new-found system of unprofessional-Internet-merchants 
transactions work.  The garage sales, the flea markets, and the 
unprofessional seller who advertises the sale of a good in the local 
newspaper were in many ways one-off and sporadic.  These transactions 
existed, but the regularity or the commercial prominence of such 
transactions did not exist.  With the Internet-age, unprofessional-
 65. “Caveat Emptor” is a Latin proverb that means “buyer beware.”  See “Caveat,” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  The proverb has been described as “good 
advice” for buyers, not necessarily a statement of some duty of buyers to ask every 
possible question concerning the good. Whether caveat emptor is applicable is generally 
on a case-by-case basis. 
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merchant transactions occur every day.  It has essentially evolved into a 
new business model.  The unprofessional Internet merchant has taken its 
place alongside the business merchant and the goods merchant. 
The Article 2 drafters’ world had two merchants: (1) the business 
merchant, and (2) the goods merchant, with the common law evolving to 
protect certain commercial transactions.  Article 2’s drafters codified 
common law practices with some modifications.  As buyers and sellers 
became more sophisticated and the common law evolved, the drafters 
sought to give buyers the protection of law and give sellers reasonable 
rules to abide by.66
The commercial world continues to evolve.  Just as the courts, and 
subsequently Article 2’s drafters, conceived of the merchantability 
concept to protect transactions that the express warranty could not 
protect67, so should Article 2 contain a new protection for buyers 
involved in unprofessional-Internet-merchant transactions, and a new 
standard for unprofessional Internet merchants to adhere to.  Just as the 
law developed over time to take into account the evolving and changing 
commercial world in the past, the law must continue to develop and take 
into account emerging and evolving commercial transactions. 
VI. CHOOSING A NEW KIND OF WARRANTY  
FOR A NEW KIND OF TRANSACTION 
Article 2’s drafters codified the common law of commercial 
transactions as these rules applied at that time.  Business merchants and 
goods merchants were contemplated.  Express warranties required 
sellers to deliver as promised, and assured the buyer that if the buyer did 
not get what was promised, the buyer had a remedy.  Implied warranties 
held specialized merchants to a higher standard, and gave buyers a 
heightened-level of assurances when dealing with these specialized 
merchants.  But with the arrival of the Internet, which gave birth to the 
unprofessional Internet merchant, these warranties as written are not 
necessarily sufficient to protect the buyer.  An examination of warranties 
in an Internet-age transaction follows. 
 
 
 
 66. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (2003). 
 67. Id. 
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A. The Problem with Express and Implied Warranties 
The express warranty likely protects the bulk of Internet-based 
transactions.  The majority of goods sold on person-to-person sites can 
be described in terms that would get the express warranty protection.  
eBay and its cousins generally have a picture of the good for sale along 
with a description; this combination amounts to an express warranty.68  
If the good sold does not meet these express representations, the express 
warranty is thus breached and the aggrieved buyer has a remedy. 
The problem with express warranties arises when terms and 
descriptions with less-than-clear-cut meanings are used to describe the 
good.  What is meant exactly by describing a good as in “mint 
condition”?  “Mint,” when used to describe a coin, may have an entirely 
different meaning when the word is used to describe the condition of a 
thirty-year-old comic book.  Terms can have different meanings to 
different people, and can have different meanings when applied to 
different goods.  Express warranties tend to work in generic terms.  But 
when terms with specialized meanings are involved, notably in the 
faceless-distance transaction, an Internet-based seller should be 
obligated to take additional steps. 
In the standard person-to-person site, the participating seller is 
generally, although not exclusively, not a professional.  Therefore, the 
implied warranty of merchantability is inapplicable.  There are 
situations, however, where an Internet-based seller is indeed a goods 
merchant and, therefore, the implied warranty is applicable.  This 
information, however, is not disclosed; eBay et al, do not require sellers 
to disclose their identity.69  Obviously, without disclosure, the buyer 
would not have knowledge about the seller, and therefore would not 
have the assurances that are implicit in a transaction with a professional.  
In order to remove the gray area, an Internet-based seller should be 
obligated to take additional steps. 
B. Additional Step Number 1: Identity Disclosure 
Internet-based sellers should be required to disclose their identity, 
profession, business and other related experiences.  This disclosure 
 
 68. See Lawrence & Henning, supra note 55, at 120. 
 69. See generally eBay Privacy Policy, available at http://pages.ebay.com/help/ 
policies/privacy-policy.html#Disclosure (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). 
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obligation would fill the gap regarding the buyer’s knowledge of the 
seller. 
In the historical faceless-distance transaction, the buyer knows with 
whom the buyer is dealing.  When a buyer orders from the J.C. Penny 
Christmas catalogue, the buyer knows that they are dealing with J.C. 
Penny, a professional merchant.  Embedded in this transaction are the 
Article 2 assurances that the buyer is protected should the good not 
perform as promised or as ordinarily expected. 
In all but one of the transaction discussed, it was only the faceless-
distance transaction with the unprofessional merchant that the buyer had 
no knowledge of the seller.  This disclosure would provide the buyer 
with that knowledge. 
C. Additional Step Number 2: Full Goods Disclosure 
As previously mentioned, the express warranty would be sufficient 
to provide a protective covering in an overwhelming number of eBay 
transactions.  A photograph and a generic description would inform the 
buyer of what he or she would get should the buyer decide to proceed 
with the transaction.  If the good, upon arrival, does not conform to the 
description, the express warranty was breached and the buyer has a 
remedy. 
But when terms that can have different meanings are used, or when 
the terms used have very specific meanings within a certain trade or 
course of business, the express warranty is insufficient.  Conflicting 
understandings of a term’s meaning may leave an aggrieved buyer 
without a remedy, and possibly allow an individual to sell without 
proper rules to abide by. 
A full goods disclosure should require the seller to describe the 
good with particularity—minute details of the good should be disclosed.  
This is just.  Since the buyer has no opportunity to examine the good, 
and may not have the heightened-level implied warranty protection, the 
seller should abide by rules that provide this added protection to the 
buyer. 
A goods disclosure should require that the seller provide the proper 
meaning of certain words used in the description of the good advertised 
for sale or for auction.  For example, in the hypothetical at the start of 
this essay, the seller used the term “rare” to describe the coin.  Under 
this proposed disclosure obligation, the seller would have to provide a 
definition of the word “rare” as that term relates to the coin trade.  
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Definitions of this type are generally found in certain trade-related 
publications.70
VII. CONCLUSION 
The oft-stated phrase that we should first begin with the statute is 
applicable here.  The proposed additions to the U.C.C. are as follows: 
 
§ 2-104. Definitions: “Merchant”; “Between Merchants”; 
“Financing Agency”; “Unprofessional Internet Merchant” 
(4) An unprofessional Internet merchant is a merchant who engages 
in transactions over an Internet-based venue.  Such merchant does not 
deal in goods of the kind and does not hold himself out to having any 
special knowledge with goods of the kind. 
 
§ 2-315a. Disclosures in an Internet-Based Transaction 
(1) Any seller who engages in transactions over an Internet-based 
venue that is not the seller’s Internet-based venue but is an Internet-
based venue that allows multiple sellers to sell goods must disclose: 
(a) The seller’s name; 
(b) Whether the seller deals in goods of the kind in the seller’s 
ordinary course of business; and 
(c) Any specialized knowledge the seller may have in the good that 
the seller is attempting to sell. 
(2) In regards to the good sold, the seller must disclose: 
(a) A detailed description of the good; 
(b) The meaning of words used to describe the good; and 
(c) If the words used to describe the good have a specific meaning 
within the trade or usage that the good is a part of, the seller must 
disclose the definition of such words. 
 
Let us return to the hypothetical that was presented at the start of 
this essay.  If the seller disclosed that the seller is not a professional coin 
seller, the buyer has gained information about the seller that the buyer 
could have obtained if this was a face-to-face transaction.  If the buyer 
discloses the meaning of the term “rare” as that term is used in the coin 
 70. For example, the U.S. Coin Redbook defines terms as these terms relate to 
coins.  Similar publications are available for other good types. 
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trade, the buyer is then given full disclosure, because rare has a specific 
meaning in this trade, and the seller did or did not use the term 
appropriately. 
In each of the possible transactions conceived by Article 2’s 
drafters, the fundamentals, as mentioned, were knowledge and 
reasonableness: the knowledge the seller had regarding the good; the 
knowledge the buyer had regarding the seller; and the seller’s reasonable 
requirements to engage in the transaction.  The new type of transaction, 
which involves the unprofessional Internet merchant, did not necessarily 
have these fundamental protections.  The proposed additions to Article 2 
take this into account through disclosure.  Disclosure of the seller’s 
identity and business practices gives the buyer knowledge of whom the 
buyer is dealing with in a faceless-Internet-based transaction.  Full 
disclosure of the good, including the proper meaning of terms used to 
describe the good, gives the buyer full knowledge of the good.  Both of 
these disclosure obligations provide reasonable rules for a seller to abide 
by in an Internet-based transaction.  In following its historical pattern of 
codifying commercial practices, the Article 2’s reporters should codify 
these proposed rules regarding these evolving commercial transactions.
